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Thinking and Acting in Military Pedagogy

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Military Ethics and Moral Dilemmas: Between "On the Job Learning" and Formal Education

Overview: Ethics as the Moral Fiber of the Army

Ongoing concern with ethical and normative issues constitutes the moral and exis-tential fiber of any army in a democratic country. Therefore, the development of a moral doctrine is the basis for shaping a separate, distinct identity that lends depth and validity to the military career. The development of the moral and ethical aware-ness of commanders is essential in an organization whose existence focuses on acts of violence and use of force, which are forbidden from a moral point of view.

However, moral identity, which is often expressed in codes of ethics, cannot be separated from the norms prevailing in the society and in the country at a given time[1]. Moreover, over the years the gap between the civil norms of Western socie-ties and the value system of the army has grown. The erosion of values such as col-lective discipline, sacrificing one's life for the country, responsibility, personal example, and even identification with and legitimation of the goals of war appear to have influenced the army and penetrated into the military system. Erosion exacts a price which might affect the spirit of combat, the quality of performance in mis-sions, and the norms of conduct in routine and emergency situations. However, the gap between civil and military norms also arouses welcome skepticism. Thus, there is a need to constantly examine the gaps and to seek bold responses to questions of identity.

This gap also explains some of the increasing difficulty that Western armies have encountered in the attempt to instill values and grapple with ethical dilem-mas. However, a second reason for the complexity of instilling military ethics is the changing face of war, as reflected in the transition from high-intensity to low-intensity warfare. In that process, large-scale national war, which is characterized by space, mass, and organized and uniform forces, has been replaced by a strug-gle with a diverse range of threats emanating from various sources, e.g., esoteric, grass-roots civil movements spanning the globe, often engaging in subversive, gang-like activity. As a result of this transition, the military organization faces numerous and more complex dilemmas.

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1   I would like to thank IDF Reserve General Roni Suleimani from the Education and Youth
     Corps for this important insight.

The Uniqueness and Complexity of the Israeli Case

Israel has been waging an ongoing struggle with terrorism. In that sense, Israel is the only democracy in the world that has been coping for years with various types of military threats, and particularly with the threat of terror. Unfortunately, the broad scope of these threats has provided opportunities to learn, understand, and cope with the situation, as well as to make decisions about military actions in general and complex ethical considerations in particular.

The threat of fanatical terror that Israel faces has taken on various forms over the years, including: Palestinian suicide bombings, where terrorists have been sent to carry out suicide attacks in the heart of Israeli cities and among Israel's civilian population; terrorism perpetrated by the Hezbollah, where hundreds of rockets have been fired indiscriminately on localities in the north of Israel; attacks from Hamas, where thousands of Qassam rockets have been fired on the town of Sderot and other cities in the southern region of Israel. This indiscriminate terror has forced the civilian population of Israel to deal with fear, destruction, and death.

The tactics used by the terror organizations are based on psychological warfare, where the residents' sense of personal security is constantly undermined, and deliberate physical damage is done to residential buildings and schools, coffee shops, and shopping centers. The damage is incurred by firing a few rockets and exploiting the weaknesses and fears of the population on the other side. Above all, the perpetrators exploit the fact that Israel is a westernized, relatively liberal society where the sanctity of all human life is valued, and where media exposure is extensive. Israel cannot respond to a terror attack with terror. We are hardly even able to shoot back at those who fire rockets at civilians.

This is an asymmetric conflict, where the hands of the state are tied by the law, whereas the hands of the other side are free to perpetrate acts that are not bound by any democratic principles or laws. The opponents of Israel often use guerilla warfare and semi-military war tactics; it uses a strategy of disappearance. When it wishes it confronts the army with uniforms and weapons; and when it wishes it sheds its uniforms, enters homes, and brandishes the weapons from a place of hiding so that the military force will expose its Achilles heel.

The task of fighting terror is highly problematic. It involves military activity against perpetrators whose goals are defined as civilian and who hide among the civilian population. The Palestinian population is exploited as a human shield to deter the Israel Defense Forces from preemptive strikes and from rooting out the source of the threat. However, it is the moral duty of the commanders to emphasize the army's practical commitment to the principles of *self defense and the*

necessity of military force together with the principle of *restraint in the use of force*. The democratic state is morally committed to protect the lives of its citizens from the danger of terrorism, and that is also a moral stand. Protection should be obtained, for example, by neutralizing the sources of terror and by attaining long-term deterrence – but how far can the Israel Defense Forces go? In a democratic state, the army is committed to adhere to the codes of international law and military ethics. It is committed to develop its officers and face these challenges in a professional way, based on considerations of proportionality, accurate assessment, and discretion. This behavior is expected, even in the face of sharp criticism against the policies of the IDF – especially criticism against the way that the army has planned and carried out missions aimed at neutralizing the centers of Palestinian terror. Nonetheless, there is a need for serious, responsible criticism based on rational considerations and comprehensive understanding of the facts.

The Aim of the Article

The article aims to present the main challenges faced by the Israel Defense Forces in the effort to maintain military ethics in combat, with special emphasis on the types of dilemmas that the army needs to address. An attempt will be made to discuss the learning opportunities inherent in the situations the army has been forced to deal with, and to present a wide range of examples for the development of normative thought and for the professional and ethical development of officers. In the context of topics related to military ethics, the article will deal with the *way* that a just war is waged (*jus in bellum*) rather than with the "just war" per se (*jus ad bellum*) which, in principle, relates mainly to decisions made at the political level.

What is a Dilemma?

The term dilemma relates to a situation in which a choice has to be made between two or more alternatives. However, an *ethical dilemma* is a situation that will often generate an apparent conflict between *moral imperatives*, in which to obey one would result in transgressing another. The dilemma creates a situation of conflict within the individual, and is usually very difficult to resolve. Even though every dilemma reflects internal contradictions between a person's desires, there are various reasons for those contradictions.

- Moral dilemmas: this type of dilemma involves conflicts that derive from motives related to matters of conscience, and to difficulties about what is "right". The dilemma arises when a person has difficulty deciding which alternative is more moral – even if in principle the situation often can be resolved.
- Dilemmas related to costs and benefits: In a "cost and benefit" situation, the dilemma involves different alternatives, where the individual has to decide which alternative will be more beneficial.
- Default: A situation in which none of the available options are chosen, i.e., the choice not to choose.

An ethical dilemma is created when there is a conflict between values, and when a choice has to be made between acts that represent different standards for appropriate behavior. This dilemma represents structural tension between sets of values:

- *Universal social values*: Values that reflect what is right and appropriate in any society. For example, in the postmodern world the prevailing values are based on moral pluralism, which legitimizes differences in perceptions of justice and equity. The situation is further complicated by the fact that a given set of values does not persist over time, and that their importance can change in light of developments in the modern world. Even though all armies have an ethical code, prevailing social values do not remain static. In Israeli society, willingness to give national interests priority over one's personal life is not as high as it was in the past; nor is the perception of military service as a mission as prevalent as it was in the past. Thus, the balance between the values of concern for the needs of the individual versus the needs of the collective has changed over the years – and it is those values that highlight the complexity and problematic nature of decisions regarding various dilemmas.
- *Professional values*: These are the values that professionals set for themselves, irrespective of the organizations that employ them, in order to establish clear professional standards and to protect themselves or those who use their services.

Since its establishment, the IDF has been guided by a code of ethics which includes ten important values.[2] Of those, the three basic values delineated in the Spirit of the IDF are as follows:

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2   The ten values delineated in the "Spirit of the IDF" are as follows: Tenacity of purpose in performing missions and drive to victory; responsibility; credibility; personal example; human life; purity of arms; professionalism; discipline; comradeship; and sense of mission.

- *Defense of the state, its citizens and its residents*: The IDF's goal is to defend the existence of the State of Israel, its independence, and the security of the citizens and residents of the state.
- *Love of the homeland and loyalty to the country*: At the core of service in the IDF is the love of the homeland and the commitment and devotion to the State of Israel – a democratic state that serves as a national home for the Jewish People, its citizens, and residents.
- *Human dignity*: The IDF and its soldiers are obligated to protect human dignity. Every human being is of value regardless of his or her origin, religion, nationality, gender, status, or position.

Additional values are:

- *Organizational values*: These are values which derive from the organization's domain of activity, and which the organization has defined for itself in order to attain its goals. The values that guide the behavior of the organization, or influence the professional behavior of the organization's members. They cannot derive from the unique leadership behavior that commanders demand during certain periods and that are consistent with the Spirit of the IDF, such as excellence, modesty, etc.
- *Personal values*: Beliefs, attitudes, and opinions that derive from the individual's internal world, such as religious conscience or values instilled in the parental home. Soldiers serving in the army represent and believe in different values or political and moral perspectives which evidently influence the way they perceive the legitimacy of their own activities or those of the organization.

By nature, war involves a conflict between different values or between different types of moral obligations, e.g., the obligation to refrain from killing and the sanctity of human life versus the right and obligation of self defense or the obligation to save human lives. In the case of a military ethical dilemma, and in the war against terror, the conflict involves a need to address four additional challenges:

- Tenacity of purpose in performing missions
- Preserving the lives of soldiers
- Preserving the lives and integrity of innocent civilians
- Preserving the lives, well-being, and security of citizens of the country

Therefore, when these values conflict with each other, we may ask ourselves several personal and professional questions:

- Do the values delineated in the Spirit of the IDF still provide the basis for solving this problem? In solving the problem, does one value naturally take priority over another?
- Is there a need to adopt new values as a basis for coping with the problem (Kasher & Yadlin, 2005)?
- Is there any value that naturally takes priority over the others, and if so, why? What does that mean? Is it right and fair?
- Would soldiers, the Israeli civilian population, and military commanders see this as the solution to the problem if they are put to the "mirror test"? Would they be satisfied with their decision?
- How will the decision be explained to the international community? Is it consistent with international law?
- Is the decision balanced? Does the alternative allow for a balance between different values or interests?

Learning and Professional Development in Dealing with Dilemmas

The task of dealing with a moral dilemma – beyond being part of the reality imposed on the organization and its staff members – lays the foundations for constant professional development. Because army commanders have to cope with new realities every day, their efforts result in the development of knowledge, understanding, thinking, and experience in the profession – in this case, the military profession. People learn through dilemmas, and the process of deliberation generates new insights about the world: it plays an important role in the process of development.

Professional development is an outcome of coping with situations that pose challenges and stimulate thought; it occurs in formal institutional settings, particularly in military academies or military colleges, as well as "on the job", when the soldier observes senior officers making decisions in their daily lives. In the IDF, formal programs are based on elements of theories, case studies, simulations, meetings with commanders, and self reflection. The dilemmas are constructed as hypothetical cases. In that context, they are carefully formulated to allow for real deliberation about the different considerations, or they are presented as historical and actual case studies and narrated from the perspective of the commanders or instructors.

The reality of combat, however, is a situation that the commander deals with daily in the context of training, and it goes beyond the level of hypothetical cases. In that reality, the commander exercises discretion, examines how his own direct

commanders operate, how his superior commanders act, and what the prevailing mood is in the unit, in the media, and among the civilian population. This latent and manifest learning constitutes an important tool for constant exploration of the different levels of the profession, and it is the ethical foundation underlying his activity. However, in formal learning as well as in the field, there is often a conflict between the values that guide the combat operation, and the values that guide other military activities such as humanitarian intervention, maintaining peace, intervention in natural disasters, etc. In many cases, different environments call for different choices.

Individual, group, and organizational learning about issues related to military ethics should not be based on constant examination of gaps. The culture of discourse that focuses on gaps between espoused values and actual values is complicated to implement. In that culture, controversial questions are posed to a group, and emphasis is placed on critical thinking, as well as on analysis of the reasons why we are far from attaining our espoused goals, or why we continue grappling with dilemmas – these are a complicated methods to implement (Raviv, 2005). However, in the hierarchical military culture, learning through a process of questioning is not always consistent with the need to provide clear, well-founded answers and with the need for military discipline, uniform goals, and relations based on authority. An effective discussion of ethical dilemmas in the classroom, in the unit, or on the battlefield will be possible only when the model of authoritative command and compliance with instructions is replaced by dialogue. In that setting, there is often an "institutional truth", but the means of reaching that truth need to be genuine and bold.

Military dilemmas can be discussed along three dimensions, as mentioned above. In the following section, I will demonstrate some of the dilemmas that typify each dimension, as they have found expression in the reality of the Israel Defense Force in recent years.

Ethical Dilemmas – Actions to be Taken in Each of the Three Dimensions in which the Military Operates

When developing ethical awareness, it is important to note the three main entities that the military professional interacts with: 1) the people – the basic body for which he works, i.e., the democratic state and all its citizens; 2) colleagues – commanders, subordinates, the unit; and obviously 3) the enemy. The Spirit of the IDF deals with all three, and adopts the principles and values most appropriate for each interaction.

In the introduction to this article, I emphasized the complex dilemma of dealing with terror. However, in the war against terror, the laws of combat should be followed professionally and with restraint. In the war against terror, indiscriminate actions are not taken. On the contrary – attacks are aimed at the sites where rockets are manufactured, launched, and supplied, as well as at armed killers, and sometimes at the leaders who plan, incite, and guide the forces that carry out the attacks. However, as mentioned, the launching sites are situated in dense population centers, on the assumption that they will serve as a civilian shield. For example, thousands of Qassam rockets are fired at localities in the southern region of Israel. Which considerations should guide the IDF in its efforts to cope with those attacks?

An examination of the principles guiding the IDF before a military operation is approved and implemented reveals that the planning processes are extremely careful, even if that aspect is not sufficiently emphasized in the public discourse. Intelligence investigations outline the target of the operation, i.e., to strike at the center of terrorist activity, and provide a picture of the civilian environment in which the proposed operation will take place. Not only does the army have no intention of harming civilians or even causing minimal damage, but the actual objective is to carry out the strike against the terrorists without touching civilians at all. In that respect, the guiding principle is the necessity of military action. That is, military action must be fully justified on the grounds that if it is not carried out, it will not be possible to protect the civilian population of the country. As such, if the IDF attacks a civilian environment, it has to be done as a military necessity (Kasher & Yadlin, 2005). If there is any way of achieving the same degree of success with the same risk to the lives of soldiers and less risk to civilians in the targeted area, then that option should be the preferred one. If that is not possible, then the operation should not be undertaken at all, and efforts should be made to use other strategies. In any case, it is clear that indiscriminate attacks against non-military targets are viewed as unacceptable in the IDF.

However, what happens when the Hamas positions children on the roofs of houses where rockets and weapons are stored? Is it permissible to destroy agricultural fields and homes in an area where Qassam rockets are fired daily? If so, to what extent should this be done, and how is proportionality determined in this case?

Some of the complaints directed against the IDF in the Second Lebanon War related to the army's preference for protecting the lives of civilians on the side of the enemy over protecting the lives of Israeli citizens. It has also been argued that the IDF could have made more of an effort to stop the rocket attacks on the civilian population of the north and reduce the number of Israeli fatalities. In any

case, when innocent lives are taken inadvertently, the sword is turned in the other direction. Unfortunately, in the struggle for public awareness, it is the picture of innocent civilians falling victim to bloody acts that makes the ultimate impression. In the struggle for public awareness, Israel does not have the advantage. Israel has not succeeded in explaining that civilians are killed in air strikes because the homes under attack are actually factories that manufacture Qassam rockets. In the international media, Israel is unable to give momentum to the fact that in February 2008, when the Hamas shelled the *Sufa* crossing, 60 trucks entered with food from Israel as part of an effort to provide humanitarian aid. This message also has important implications for the morale of Israeli soldiers. Oftentimes, the "struggle for public awareness" is not affected by a given military operation. Rather, it is affected by a picture in the paper.

Finally, it is important to mention that in cases where accepted values are violated, or in cases where normative patterns of behavior should have been maintained but criminal acts were committed despite serious deliberations and thought, the necessary disciplinary measures should be taken to root out the failure. In cases where deviant command culture and norms are identified, they should be severely punished as an example for all to see. This kind of treatment relates to training, command, and practice in the field.

Dilemmas of the Army vis-à-vis the Political Entity it Serves

It often happens that soldiers and commanders don't identify wholeheartedly with the tasks they are given – and army service is often based on a political social ideal such as Zionism. The soldier and commander can voice reservations about the moral legitimacy of going to war or the legitimacy of what is done in the context of war. Even if the military mission is professional, legal, and binding, personal identification with the mission lends validity and meaning to its implementation. What happens when there is a complex discourse between a soldier and commander regarding the military order that the soldier was required to carry out – even if the order was totally legal? What dilemmas can the order arouse, and what is their significance? A case in point is the implementation of the Disengagement Plan in the summer of 2005. When the disengagement from the Gaza Strip took place, 25 settlements in the Gaza Strip and the Northern West Bank were evacuated. This was a dramatic test for Israeli society and democracy, and posed a complex challenge to Israel's interagency security cooperation.

Even though the disengagement was the outcome of a decision made by the government of a democratic state, it had the potential to cause a serious rift in the army. Some of the soldiers who were given the command to implement the disengagement were religious people who viewed the settlement of the land of

Israel as a sacred duty and obligation. As such, the evacuation of civilians from their homes aroused intense, complex, and harsh emotions. Thus, they grappled with the question of identity and had a conflict between loyalty to their rabbis versus compliance with their commanders. The disengagement was implemented against the background of a deep-rooted and long-standing disagreement about the future of the "territories", and the act of disengagement was perceived as a declaration of a permanent border of the state of Israel. The army dealt with that process by distinguishing between two concepts: "justness of the ideological cause" and "justness of the military cause"[3] The idea was to maintain an apolitical position and continue implementing government policies as a type of professional stand, and as an expression of the concept of representation and loyalty. This was done through just use of force, restraint, proportionality, military solidarity, sensitivity, and respect for the evacuees. Conceptual organization of the dilemma and development of relevant knowledge relating to military activity in an era of controversy does not solve the dilemma. However, it can be a guideline for soldiers and their units when they are performing a task in the present or future.

Dilemmas Concerning Relationships between Soldiers and their Comrades

Given the nature of its activity, the military organization has to adhere to basic values of standing by its units and commanders, where every effort is made to successfully complete the missions of the unit. Comradeship in arms, willingness to help others and put oneself at risk, and even willingness to sacrifice one's life for others are all basic values in any army. In the Second Lebanon War, there arose a dilemma which posed a conflict between tenacity of purpose in performing missions and the drive to victory on the one hand and the values of comradeship and personal example on the other. According to the Winograd Commission Report (2008), the fulfillment and maintenance of some of the values of the IDF during the Second Lebanon War was deficient. These deficiencies were not because the norms of operation themselves were bad or inappropriate. Rather, the norms were not properly maintained. The Commission placed special emphasis on norms relating to tenacity of purpose in performing the mission and the drive for victory even in the face of difficulties and casualties.

The Winograd Commission found that some people at higher levels of command gave orders to stop advancing or to stop fighting rather than let the rescue and medical forces evacuate wounded soldiers. It appears that these high levels of command exhibit excessive tolerance for constant delays, which prevent forces from performing their mission. In addition, commanders tend to approve

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3   Concepts coined by Prof. Asa Kasher.

or delay missions on the grounds that the forces are not completely ready to act, or on the grounds that weather conditions are not optimal. The fighters and commanders have not always understood why it is essential to sacrifice themselves and take risks in order to enter an area that will be evacuated immediately after the battle. The message regarding the importance of minimizing casualties, which was conveyed at the higher ranks of the military command and at the political level, affected the planning of the mission and reinforced the ethical orientation dictated by the value of comradeship – as reflected in the need to care for the wounded.

In addition, the Commission Report mentioned weaknesses in implementing the value of personal example. When the battles were taking place, some of the commanders did not position themselves alongside their combat forces; they stayed in war rooms instead and maintained control from there. The value of personal example is perceived as sharply contradicting the desire to enhance the capacity to command from a distance using advanced technology. It is difficult to convey a message to fighters that emphasizes the importance of combat and of performing missions when the commanders are sitting on the sidelines. The importance and necessity of war are not self evident, and in light of the conclusions of the Winograd Commission, it appears that over the years, the practice of commanders staying with their forces in the field has been eroded.

Future Dilemmas and Implementation of Solutions – Summary

The presentation of various dilemmas on the three areas in which the army operates highlights the accuracy of the statement that "reality is the playing field"; reality is the richest, surprising, and most complex context on earth. It affects the military career in several ways – areas of knowledge, tools, and the values by which it operates. The more changes occur with regard to the nature of combat, the orientation toward individualism, and the widening of social gaps, the more complex techniques will have to be employed in dealing professionally with the dilemmas.

The military institutions are responsible for identifying the dilemmas in an organized way, but the commanders also bear responsibility in the context of encounters and activities in the field. In the endeavor of putting values into effect it is no less important to engage in constant identification of potential gaps, and in deliberating possible reasons for the existence of those gaps.

Even if it were possible to solve the dilemmas in certain cases, it is necessary to consider how the values and principles we choose can be instilled, what measures and signs indicate that the values and principles have been instilled, what terms and concepts should be used to indicate those values, and what organiza-

tional measures need to be taken to promote them. How can comprehensive, extensive strategies be constructed to deal with deviations and failures – if those are found? And how can those issues be addressed in training courses? What forums should be used in order to talk about those issues and to effectively convey the messages about what we are not prepared to compromise on? Of course, when it comes to solving dilemmas it is important not only to talk, but also to make the words consistent with actions. In that context, it is important to determine appropriate rewards and sanctions, and to constantly seek practical mechanisms of assimilating them into the military organizations – in routine situations and in situations of emergency.

Instilling values is the greatest challenge faced by armies. Ethical dilemmas are *part* of the act of combat, and are not a separate area that should be ignored. In the future, officers will have to brainstorm in order to come up with ideas about how to fight terror and ideological fanaticism. They will have to have a good understanding of the political aspects of war, the complexity of military-social relations, the operational implications, and the gaps in consensus about some applications of international law – for not everything that is legal is also ethical, and vice versa. When professional standards are raised, values are enhanced. That is how the message is conveyed to society that the army understands the magnitude of its mission and the extent of its responsibility. Only thus will armies – including the IDF – be able to continue enjoying support from the public, which is so essential.

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Developing Senior Leaders:
Challenges, Methodologies, and Dilemmas

Introduction

The abundance of literature on leadership emphasizes its relevance. The topic of leadership has continued to concern researchers for centuries, and the literature attests to its changing, complex nature. In recent years, there has been a need for further distinctions between different levels in the hierarchy of leadership. In that connection, several questions arise: How is senior leadership different from junior leadership? Are the teaching methods used to educate senior officers different from those used to train younger officers? What professional perspectives affect the development of senior leaders? And what methodological difficulties and challenges are encountered by military colleges in the process of developing senior leaders?

The Task Environment of Senior Commanders:
The Changing Face of Warfare

Senior commanders operate in an environment that has become increasingly complex. Today, wars continue for a relatively long time, and they are similar to cultural wars of attrition which are directed to the arena of national consciousness. Giora Eiland (2007) analyzed six dimensions of change in the nature of warfare that have affected the environment in which senior commanders operate:

First, there has been a change in analysis and adaptation of variables in asymmetric wars that take place in densely populated civilian areas. That issue has posed three challenges. One challenge relates to intelligence – not only determining *where* the enemy is, but *who* the enemy is. Another challenge relates to identifying an enemy, when the enemy may alter in light of rapid changes in diplomatic relationships and political definitions. The third challenge relates to characterization of a relevant target. The enemy is not a standing target, nor does he stay in one place for long. Rather, he is constantly moving, and his location can change within a matter of minutes and even seconds.

Second, there has been a change in the relationships between the political and military systems. In traditional wars, the political system notifies the military that it is expected to win the war, and the politicians deal with its outcomes. The definition of victory is usually clear, and can be interpreted in military terms. It is demarcated in terms of its area, time frame, and political framework. In a low intensity conflict, the boundaries between the political and military systems are sometimes blurred. It is not always clear what goals should be achieved, and strategic objectives are not always properly defined. In this situation, there is a need for a different type of dialogue that is not based on hierarchy. It is important to discuss not only how to attack, but to question whether it is right to attack. Toward that end, frequent discussions are held between military and political officials. Every political action has implications for security, and vice-versa. Officials on both sides need to meet more frequently in order to discuss the current state of reality. In addition, there is a growing connection between opportunism in the political leadership and public loss of faith in the government, its leaders and its institutions, as well as a growing sense that political leaders are sometimes involved in corrupt decision-making processes (Ben-Yishai, 2007). In light of these developments, there is an increasing need to create a new leadership in the field of national security. Those leaders should be committed to moral values, and should emphasize the responsibilities of senior officers in the defense establishment – especially military commanders.

Third, implementing organizational and procedural change, with emphasis on achieving jointness. Current wars are no longer characterized by a clear definition of total peace or all-out combat. There are countless situations that require a different type of division of authority and coordination between various entities. For example, an interagency dialogue was held in the United States on the topic of Homeland Security after the Twin Towers attack in 2001. Similarly, an alternative type of dialogue was required in Israel to fight terror. In that process, the leading security agents (the Mossad, the Military Intelligence Directorate, and the General Security Services) were called on to establish new mutual domains of responsibility. This was important, because some of the coordination in these domains transcends institutional boundaries. Clearly, the responsibility for establishing this kind of dialogue lies with the senior officials in the national security system.

Fourth, coping with the challenges of new information technology. More advanced, destructive technologies are not always effective. In fact, sometimes the opposite is the case: technologies need to be adapted to the new threat, where the goal is not necessarily to achieve maximal destruction. On the contrary, there is need to use less lethal technologies such as small unmanned aerial vehicles.

Fifth, proper and wise use of the media. The senior commander is influential and manages an environment in which there is intensive media coverage. In that

context, it is important to promote a dialogue with civilians – especially in order to gain national and international legitimacy for military operations. That kind of dialogue will allow for freedom of action and sometimes enable the military operation to be prolonged if necessary. It is critical for the senior officer to be familiar with the media and competent in conveying and understanding messages through the media.

Sixth, debunking myths. In the context of modern wars, some myths are shattered. One myth relates to definitions of the duration of war. For example, Major General Eiland notes: "If we defeated four armies in six days in 1967, then how many days do we need to defeat only a few thousand Hezbollah fighters?" (p. 17). Another myth relates to the number of casualties in war. Some confrontations are "wars of choice". In those contexts, there is an unrealistic expectation that our side will win the war without endangering our soldiers, because we have sophisticated weapons that can attack from a distance. A third myth relates to the ability to avoid harming innocent civilians. We will support an all-out war with the Hamas as long as the casualties are solely enemy soldiers. But when the television shows horrific pictures of killed children, we begin to have profound doubts and reservations. In those cases, we criticize ourselves and ask disconcerting questions about the justification of military action. A typical question raised in Israel is: "What happened to us?". It's not always clear why we're here and what we're fighting for; whether the price is worthwhile. A fourth myth relates to the ability to achieve a decisive victory. We are prepared to pay the price of war if we achieve a decisive, clear victory where the enemy surrenders or gives up the will to fight. However, in the new war the perception of victory depends on one's world view, and is based on a narrative that is difficult to change.

In light of that situation, senior officers are called on to win the new types of wars that characterize the 21st century. They need to prepare for different types of conflicts by showing flexibility and versatility in the use of security systems and recognize limitations in the use of military force. In the effort to gain enhanced legitimacy from society, they need to employ a strategy that recognizes the possibility that there will be violent confrontations and that people will be killed. They also need to be attentive to critical voices which question the justification for their approach and the purity of arms in every instance. In addition, they need to be able to explain the actions of the military and gain support through a dialogue with citizens and soldiers from the entire political spectrum of society.

The Characteristics of Senior Officers

In light of the changing security situation, it appears that the characteristics of senior commanders – some of which have been characterized and defined in numerous studies (e.g., Altman, 1999) are more relevant now than ever.

Maintaining a growing physical distance in relationships with subordinates. Due to the distance, which intensifies psychological projection and attribution, the senior commander impacts his subordinates through symbolic leadership. Units are split into sub-systems, and rarely operate as an organic whole. In this context, the commander's challenge lies in enabling his soldiers to simulate an organic and yet individual framework and maintaining an atmosphere of learning and cohesion (Kaplinsky, 2007).

Attaining desired outcomes through other managerial levels. Because the leader operates through intermediaries and intermediate level staff, he needs to be able to develop systems to influence his subordinates. In that context, he needs to choose – or at least be involved in choosing – managers who will know how to convey his messages to the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy.

Understanding the limitations of control. The senior officer is responsible for handling a tremendous volume of information and knowledge. In an environment where the mission involves complex tasks characterized by feedback, dependence, and unclear cause-effect relationships, the senior officer grapples with abstract ideas based on open questions, concepts, and symbols.

Establishing "jointness". Senior officers need to work with social networks and build partnerships based on relationships between different units and organizations. In light of this situation, there are several characteristics that are essential for working in those environments and dealing with those challenges. Above all, senior officers need to develop abilities for strategic thinking and coping with ambiguity. They need to think in terms of complementary opposites, taking into account a complex network of causes and effects and the emergence of processes over time. They also need to identify patterns that will enable them to understand and operate in a complex arena. In that context, it is essential to perform multidimensional tasks which might even be contradictory and inconsistent (e.g., there may be conflicts between political, legal, military, and economic perspectives). Senior officers also need to know how to operate in unfamiliar situations without clear instructions and how to make rapid transitions between different agencies and functions in a constant process of integration and learning. At the level of learning, senior officers have to be able to interpret situations in terms of regional and global trends. Toward this end, it is necessary to engage in strategic and innovative thinking, to construct new paradigms of reality, and to break into a

given sphere of influence. In addition, constructing new conceptual frameworks, constantly introducing innovative ideas (Ben-Ishai, 2007), developing analytical tools, and formulating organizational goals in a dynamic world is also needed. Commanders need to be able to manage complex emotional situations, to cope with ambiguity and isolation, and to bear the heavy personal burden of managing those processes. They also need to manage and influence multiple networks. This includes working in a political environment, as well as developing collaborations, strategic agreements, and alliances. In those contexts, the commanders need to have sensors to detect hidden agendas and underlying inter-organizational developments. In addition, they need to be able to manage teams of experts which specialize in areas where they lack specific knowledge.

Another interesting dimension that has emerged in recent years is the ability to *communicate in multiple languages* – to convey messages and influence people through speeches and statements, using tactical, systemic, political, strategic, media, and civilian semantics that are adapted to the target audience. Most importantly, the commander must have a high level of self-awareness, understanding the need to clarify himself and recognizing his personal style and his own strengths and weaknesses. In that context, he should be able to identify hidden assumptions, know to ask difficult questions, show modesty, and recognize the limitations of his own knowledge. Finally, the commander should know how to develop a source of internal authority.

Values Unique to Senior Leadership

In light of the above, one of the essential core characteristics of the senior officer's role is his involvement in shaping an ethical operating environment in the military. In that context, one of the officer's major concerns is to maintain the moral image of the army. Because morals and values are a fundamental part of combat, anti-terrorism warfare generates a conflict and arouses complex dilemmas on several levels: how to protect the lives of innocent civilians and restrain power when necessary; how to preserve soldiers' lives and still protect one's civilian population; and, no less important, how to establish tenacity of purpose in performing the mission.

Although all of the values of the armed forces are relevant to any combatant, it seems that three main values are most characteristic of the activity of senior leaders:

Responsibility: Responsibility means contributing to events, processes, methods, and results. In contrast to younger ranks, it is especially important for senior

commanders to assume personal responsibility for outcomes, responsibility for promoting and implementing ideas, and for the people and agencies engaged in the mission. Senior commanders assume responsibility for maintaining relevance and innovation in learning, as well as for engaging in a dialogue with agencies that collaborate with the national security system. In addition, the senior commanders represent the military vis-à-vis the civilian system – even when they personally disagree with the decisions made at the political level. Perhaps most important are the leaders' value priorities for operating in complex, ambiguous environments.

Personal example: Setting a personal example is an important value for any kind of leadership. Senior officers, more than soldiers or commanders at any other level, should serve as a role model of collegiality, honesty, loyalty, and moral integrity in decision-making. They should be role models for constructing and operating the military force. The role model is expressed through serving as a personal example at the level of the smallest things. Due to the impact of symbolic leadership, this value is enhanced even more.

Professionalism: Professional practice involves the following elements (Kasher, 2005): a systematic body of relevant knowledge; systematic proficiency in solving relevant problems; constant improvement of relevant knowledge; local understanding of the claims of knowledge and methods; and global understanding of the nature of the system of knowledge and proficiency (ethics). Not only is the senior commander responsible for promoting all of these aspects, but he is also required to master a new realm of knowledge for the sake of the operational and strategic mission. In that context, the officer aspires to achieve excellence and to broaden his local and global understanding. The leader must learn to develop a professional language appropriate for mediating between the strategic and tactical levels. However, he must be careful not to create misunderstandings, and he must make an effort to initiate a dialogue without upsetting the hierarchy of command.

Senior Leaders and the Learning Process: Characteristics and Challenges

The Paradox

Even though it is clear that such complex behavior requires formal education and learning, it is paradoxical that the higher a commander's level of seniority is, the more barriers he faces in the learning process. Meaningful learning poses challenges, as the individual confronts gaps or lacunae in his own knowledge. Therefore, senior leaders often have difficulty assuming the role of students – perhaps

because they leave a situation in which they are in control and unconsciously realize that something is lacking. Most of the knowledge is not acquired on premises that are marked by a sign "Studies in Progress". In general, learning does not take place in the courses per se. Rather, the courses facilitate the learning process. For most senior officers, learning takes place "between the lines", and not always in the formal setting of programs at military colleges. In addition, meaningful learning does not depend on what the lecturer or instructor says. Rather, it depends on the significance that the participants in courses attribute to the knowledge. Sometimes spontaneous learning events are perceived as more critical, interesting, and memorable than experiences that are anticipated and planned. However, because of role responsibilities, loneliness, and emotional isolation that commanders encounter in their role, it is important to establish planned, formal educational settings on the one hand, while giving the participants in those settings room for creativity and exploration on the other. Therefore, it is important to consider the needs of senior leaders as part of a world view that guides the development of curricula for that population.

Learning Attributes of Senior Commanders

Senior commanders have several attributes that are drastically different from those of junior officers (based on the theories of Knowles, Holton & Swanson, 1998):

1. They have *extensive life experience* which is organized into existing schemata and is part of their self-identity. As learners, they seek to identify the connections between the learned material and their past experience, and they expect their experience to be recognized. Failure to acknowledge their experience is tantamount to disregarding their identity.
2. Senior commanders have a *sense of psychological seniority and maturity*, and they prefer to decide their own future path, destiny, and activities. They have a deep psychological need for independence and do things that are consistent with their status as adults.
3. Senior commanders have a *practical, pragmatic perspective*. They look for immediate relevance in the learning process and gauge its contribution to their professional and personal development. They need to know why they are learning a specific topic and what use it is to them.
4. They have intrinsic motivation and are driven toward self-fulfillment. As such, they are influenced less by external factors. Adult learning theory assumes that the basis for learning is a functional need. However, differences in needs are varied: There are those who learn for the sake of future roles, those who seek to achieve a certain goal, or simply out of love of knowledge. Pedagogic

emphasis should be placed on intrinsic motivations such as self fulfillment and self-esteem, in contrast to extrinsic factors such as sanctions.

5. As autonomous, critical adults, they have a *skeptical attitude* toward ideas presented to them in the learning process. Therefore, learning should be based as much as possible on dialectical, critical thinking. In addition, management of educational programs for senior commanders should focus on creating a learning environment characterized by respect, mutuality, and pleasantness. Those aspects are the foundations of situations and learning environments appropriate for adults.

6. Senior commanders learn best through *activity, involvement, and solution of practical problems* relating to their organization and their jobs. They learn best when the material has personal significance for them and when they are presented with challenges.

7. Senior commanders have a well-developed sense of *"wasting time"*. They have a low stimulus threshold when it comes to activities they perceive as too time-consuming or inefficient.

8. The adult student himself is a *source of knowledge in a group*, in addition to the teacher. Therefore, peer learning is an effective learning technique for adults.

9. *Egalitarianism and fostering egalitarian relationships* between the instructors and students is a basic principle of adult education. In that context, the instructors encourage students and involve them in setting the goals, content, and methods of learning, as well as in evaluating the learning process and its outcomes. The curriculum of the course is designed according to the needs and interests of all groups. In addition, the participants are invited to engage and take part in facilitating the learning process itself.

10. It is assumed that the group of participants in the course will be *heterogeneous* in terms of their job positions, personal styles, age, organizational tracks, and geographic background. Therefore, they should be given opportunities for social interaction in the learning process, they should work in small groups, and they should be given space to choose the pedagogic and thematic tracks and issues that interest them.

Programs for Development of Senior Leaders: Methodology and Main perspectives

In light of the above, a curriculum designed for senior officers should be based on a range of considerations which encourage the participants to learn in an environment that emphasizes three principles (Raviv, 2003):

Maximal involvement and active learning: Giving senior officers an incentive to assume responsibility and control, to choose and influence the learning process, and to bring some of their own material to discuss in class. Thus, learning is not based on passive processes where the curricular content cannot be challenged. Rather, it is based on analysis and interpretation of material, with the participant involved in setting his goals of the educational process, and learning is independent and exploratory. In that context, the program facilitators are also responsible for arranging frequent meetings between the Chief of Staff, the senior board, and the participants, as well as for inviting the learners to participate in planning the agenda of the meetings.

Utilizing a variety of methods in the program: In light of the broad range of needs and expectations of the participants, and considering that they have a wide array of interests, it is important to integrate theory and practice in the program. In addition, the training program should incorporate experiences and models, group work, reading material, case studies, personal self inquiry questionnaires, meetings with senior officers, and meetings with inspirational political leaders. All of these methods combine a *dialogical environment* and constant interaction between theory and traditional knowledge on the one hand, with skepticism, practice, and conceptualization on the other.

Promoting a critical, creative study atmosphere. The program needs to let the "stormy winds" of the environment blow into the classroom and open the door to new perspectives, even if the atmosphere in the classroom might become turbulent at some points. The participants have an opportunity to express meaningful ideas that undermine existing paradigms. Nonetheless, the facilitators are called on to maintain an atmosphere of tolerance, which encourages and respects processes of change and extending of the "comfort zone". Additionally, the program should emphasize ethical dilemmas, with the understanding that even leaders in high positions don't always have clear answers to every situation.

These curricula often provide a genuine opportunity for organizations to develop valuable knowledge. That kind of learning, which occurs away from the battlefield and daily problems, invites participants to concentrate and to experience "being" rather than just "doing". In this pedagogical environment, latent knowledge emerges into articulated knowledge. If the programs are properly managed, they allow space to examine phenomena that seem marginal or yet go unnoticed in the organization. These research activities and "think tanks" have the potential to be transformed into practical models that can be utilized in the country's defense system. In national defense colleges, special care is given to new interagency models that are developed from non-sectored learning situations. However, this organizational knowledge is only one important part of learning. The most profound pivotal event that has to take place in the program is the development of an indi-

vidual sense of self efficacy and understanding, in addition to moving the participants into a position of influence, change, and self awareness.

Classic Methods of Teaching in Courses for Senior Leaders

There are many teaching methods that can be valuable in different kinds of learning situations. However, some have proven to be more appropriate or more effective for the population of senior leaders. The following are a few examples:

- Leadership and Management Workshops in Small Groups
    - Workshops that combine personal diagnostic questionnaires for leaders and 360° feedback systems combined with personal coaching. The challenge here is to offer added value to what the officer has learned on his own through his past military career.
    - Workshops that allow participants to discover personal values or challenge existing, lacking, or partially hidden values.
    - Consultation peer groups that deal with personal dilemmas related to leadership: members of these groups discuss dilemmas with each other and offer advice and solutions based on their own experiences.
    - Experiential workshops in nature, i.e., in field conditions. In those workshops, the participants can experience and conceptualize leadership and team work in a setting that is fun and challenging.
    - Role analysis workshops which enable exploration of relationships between "the self", "the role", and "the organization". This is a strong tool enabling and allowing participants to explore personal fixations and potential regressive patterns that dominate them from early states.
    - Business theaters enable analysis of real-life situations in management. This kind of workshop is conducive to implicational learning and simulations of work situations through role playing. In those contexts, situations and responses are analyzed through the medium of drama.
    - Explorational dialogue on leadership phenomena.
- Lectures
    - Renowned academic experts presenting strategic, organizational, and social models.
    - Key speakers and business leaders lecturing on decision making topics and parallel management challenges in similar defense institutions or business sectors.

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- Directors from the organization – at senior levels or retired – presenting a role model for senior leadership, with emphasis on managing crisis situations or managing change.
- Holding panels where participants present divergent and conflicting perspectives on dealing with a problem.

- Case Studies
  - Analyses of complex phenomena in the context of the real world enable experiential learning based on the life of the organization in laboratory conditions. The analysis touches on issues on the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral levels, using systemic, interdisciplinary thinking. This method prepares the participants for a world that requires critical thinking and formulation of persuasive arguments, in a limited time frame and with incomplete information (Raviv, 2008).

- Simulation
  - Creating reduced and abstract schemata of reality which reflect complex phenomena. The simulations enable participants to experience policy-making, planning, and decision-making, in addition to reconstructing critical and strategic events while developing alternatives that are not revealed in other circumstances. The method challenges latent assumptions and attitudes, enabling participants to experience change and gain new insights (Pulkka & Raviv, 2007).

- Coaching and Personal Counseling
  - Choosing development-oriented counseling in a protected situation where the counselor is a personal resource for deliberating and testing reality.

- Mentoring from Senior Leaders
  - Indirect instruction from a senior leader who is not the direct supervisor, e.g., a retired senior leader in the organization, serving as a model for learning and working, and who has extensive experience relevant to coping with reality.

- Meetings with other Audiences – Benchmarking
  - Meetings with senior leaders from parallel or different organizations, aimed at enhancing the participants' repertoire of insights about other organizational cultures, with an emphasis on case studies.

- Tours
  - Emphasis on the level of values and identity: Tours that bring senior leaders closer to the roots of their national, social, and religious identity and to the sources of their faith. The tours enhance the robustness of values and deepen the leader's knowledge of the country, its population, its social backbone, and the social fabric at the basis of the leader's unique identity and sense of purpose.

- Independent Self directed Learning
  - Curriculum design that puts formal emphasis on self directed learning and allows time for independent learning, reading texts, and interpretation of texts as a mutual process within the learning groups.
  - Inviting the participants to teach the parts of the curricular units, and to gain a monopoly on knowledge in those topics as true experts.
- Open Space
  - Opportunities to explore and spearhead topics that are important to senior leaders, to their future, and to the future of the organization. This is a technology that allows for spontaneity and independent organization from a position of passion and influence.

Of course, not all of these methodologies can be introduced into one curriculum. However, multiple teaching methods create that synergy of effective development. Those methods should be constructed as part of a coherent rationale that is consistent with current needs and recent events, as well as with the characteristics of the unique group and the goals of training.

Some Concluding Thoughts Regarding the Challenges Faced by the IDF

Notwithstanding the processes discussed above, there is a dispute on the question of whether it is possible to improve moral conduct through teaching (Talerud, 2007). It also seems that the challenges of teaching senior officers are so great today, that it is nearly impossible to succeed in accomplishing that pedagogical mission. Furthermore, although many of the suggestions raised in the article have already been implemented in the curriculum for senior officers in the IDF, we are still far from achieving the objectives.

Can we learn something from the experience of the IDF in that mission? The IDF is at the core of public discourse as a people's army. In that context, issues related to the morality of combat have been raised, such as the questions that were posed after the Operation Cast Lead (the 2008 Gaza Campaign): Did the commanders demonstrate moral discretion? Did they preserve the sanctity of life? Is the IDF still "the most moral army in the world", as it claims? In contrast to the biased image that has been portrayed in the media, senior commanders in the IDF give top priority to investigating the truth and analyzing the operations that were carries out. It is well known that most of the combat took place in densely populated residential areas. Although the Palestinian side sustained hundreds of casualties, the senior commanders who led the mission made concerted efforts to

preserve the rights of civilians in the war zone. The operation was initiated as a response to tens of thousands of rockets that were deliberately positioned behind a human shield of civilians and fired for months at the heart of Israeli cities. The IDF took extraordinary measures to inform the civilians in Gaza about the targeted areas in order to enable them to escape, in addition to allowing huge amounts of humanitarian aid to be brought into Gaza. Israel had no choice but to defend itself. However, mistakes in war do happen, and should be dealt with through profound debriefing and other measures. At the same time, commanders need to disclose phenomena that violate norms and deal harshly if found, whereas phenomena such as heroic acts need to be reinforced and strengthened. In that process, mistakes, deviations, and ethical dilemmas should be incorporated in the curriculum in subsequent years as case studies which the soldiers can learn from. It should also be noted that senior officers in the IDF face problems within their own forces. Recently, for example, religious Jewish soldiers have threatened to disobey orders if they are commanded to evacuate Jewish settlements or illegal outposts in Northern Samaria. The brigade commanders should deal harshly with any disobedience and toxic political debate running the risk of penetrating the professional military world.

These are just some of the complex challenges that IDF commanders have to contend with. If they themselves stray or make morally biased decisions, they are treated with extreme severity and are forced to leave the service. That is because high ranking commanders play a vital role in sustaining the moral backbone of the army and the nation itself.

Commanders in the IDF operate in a conflictual reality, where they are confronted with questions at home and outside, and where they grapple with the task of clarifying the boundaries between what is allowed and what is prohibited, as well as with clarifying norms in their task environment. In light of the differences between individuals in terms of values, there must be a greater level of clarity in commands in the junior ranks of the military hierarchy. Moreover, the presence of commanders in the battlefield is critical, because they are the ones who point the younger soldiers in the right direction and because they instill values in them by providing a role model for them.

In sum, senior commanders have to develop uncompromising confidence in the justice of their professional actions and the *raison d'être* of the military and state in which they operate. Will military colleges succeed in developing such an excellent senior navigator who is able to lead the soldiers effectively through the stormy oceans they face? This question has yet to be answered.

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Military Ethics Instruction – The Educational Challenge of the Case-Study Method[1]

Introduction

As Micewski & Annen (2005) put it, the issue of ethics in military education from the military pedagogical point of view is not only a question of ethically appropriate behavior but rather the challenge of actually teaching this to the trainees. Education, here, should be understood in an extensive framework that is profoundly culturally constructed and therefore deeply dependent on traditions and inherited manners and knowledge; it is not only management of knowledge to be conducted effectively and in measurable ways (e.g., Micewski, 2005; Toiskallio, 2007; Tomasello, 1999; van Baarda & Verweij, 2006). Fleck (2005) quite clearly sums this difference up by stating that although people have usually developed the necessary qualities to act in an ethically sound manner they still may and do act against their better judgment.

Kasher (2003) views the inquiry by a profession into its ethics as an inquiry into ethics itself, since professionals will understand better than others what should and what should not be done within the profession. Ethical principles are not sublime ideals, but rather rules which define desirable activities of people within their professions. Ethics as an assemblage of values and norms directs the professional as to how he should act within his profession. Consequently, ethics is in a sense equivalent to professionalism. Discussion on ethical issues in the profession constitutes a progressive step within it, bringing about an improvement in the skills of normative thinking.

This study will focus on the aspect of methodology of teaching ethics as one possible explanation for the qualitative differences in the learning of ethics. Effective and educationally sound teaching that aims at deep understanding cannot be based on methodology defined by practical economy and action-control beliefs only. The research question of this study is quite plainly put forward by Talerud (2007) as he asks, "[i]s it possible to improve people's moral conduct through teaching?" or as Robinson (2007) argues, "it is one thing to say that soldiers

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1   The views, opinions, and interpretations are the authors', and they do not necessarily represent the official national views or those of the authors' parental organisations. This paper has been previously published in 2007 under the Finnish title "Sotilasetiikan opetus – tapaustutkimuksen metodin haste" in *Tiede ja Ase, 65*, 345-362.

will have to undergo ethics training, it is quite another to ensure that they learn the right lessons". Ethical competence is something universally desirable, and nations generally agree on this. It is, however, the definition between the right and the wrong that is culturally related and disputed (Fleck, 2005; Heinonen, 2002). To shed light on this profound matter, we wish to discuss the basis for some techniques in teaching and how the results of this work should assessed.

We present considerations on how to formulate tools for the teaching of ethical matters in a framework constructed on theoretical themes of active learning and self-regulation in learning. The nature and definition of ethics are discussed to form a basis to elaborate arguments on instructional implications. The discussion is followed by a short comparison of two samples of pedagogical materials (Dutch and Canadian) and furthermore by a description of the IDF case study-method. As a conclusion, we wish to lay a foundation for further practical research on ethical education in the military.

Review of some observations on the nature of the ethics

The nature of war and conflict as well as the common sense of military necessities are usually brought forward to justify actions and their direct or collateral consequences (e.g., Fry, 2006). It is not a secret that war, as General Marshall has been quoted to have said, is hell. But war in itself has no nature as such, it is the ultimately horrible human tragedy that should be avoided at all costs, and if it cannot be avoided, it is to be fought with minimal human suffering (e.g., Reichberg, Syse & Begby, 2006). No explanation is tolerable if it refers to something metaphysical or a divine entity or being that lures combatants to act inevitably in one way or another. Decisions are made by human beings, and therefore they are only as good as their makers' imagination. Imagination is always culturally dependable and therefore the actions of armed forces in conflict are oriented by culturally elaborated guidelines (Fry, 2005; Tomasello, 1999). The dilemma of ethics is becoming more and more troublesome in the ever more complicated environment of security, as the earlier guarantees of peace and security are not enough or no longer reasonable (Heinonen, 2002).

Heinonen (ibid.) elaborates on the idea of *global ethics* and delivers two of its assumptions. First, global ethics concern the basic values and other profound premises common to all cultures, and secondly, a process of evaluating their interpretation in the current situation. As Toiskallio (2006, 2007; see also Robinson, 2007) argues, there will not be a uniform understanding of ethics, and it is most probable that Heinonen's ideation will remain in the state of utopia. But the undisputable necessity of ethical discussion in the military everywhere (e.g., Reichberg et al,

2006; Toiskallio, 2006; Värri, 2007; Verweij, 2007) obliges the educators to seek an understanding about how to put this ongoing process into action in teaching.

The teaching of ethics is not only translating a collection of codes and roles to rules of engagement or transmitting them to soldiers, it should be empowerment and activation of people to become aware of ethical problems (Toiskallio , 2007; van Baarda & Verweij, 2006) requiring an integrative curriculum (Raviv, 2005); ethics should be integrated as a part of regular military life (Robinson, 2007; van Baarda & Verweij, 2006). Having normative rules connected to rewards and punishments will not be enough for a person to become a correctly thinking and acting human (Martinelli-Fernandez, 2006), as this does not develop a skill of solving problems when there are conflicts between the rules (virtues). To educate in the area of ethics is to touch something which derives from the very sphere of the individual's lifelong experiences, knowledge, attitudes and perceptions (Toiskallio, 2007). Robinson (2007) even suggests that actual formal training may not achieve much in the field of ethics.

Prior (2000) writes that to be a modern warrior one must be educated in such a way that he/she will feel the conflict between the morality of decency and that of war, i.e., to be able to feel guilt about his/her actions in combat.[2] Martinelli-Fernandez (2006) suggests that the goal of moral education (we see the concept *moral agency,* as put forward by Martinelli-Fernandes, closely related to good ethical conduct) could be defined through the idea of Kantian autonomy as a sensitivity and an awareness about how to achieve good ethical conduct. Furthermore, she writes that training in ethics towards the Kantian autonomy will help the trainees to achieve a level of practical reasoning that will enable them to meet challenging situations by governing themselves with certain laws and principles. The distinguishing feature of a mature moral agent would be confirming to moral principles *voluntarily and for their own sake*. For example, ethical military leaders are aware of and capable and willing to use their reasoning to override unethical orders (Martinelli-Fernandez, 2006; van Baarda & van der Heijden, 2006). In Kohlbergs model (according to Robinson, 2007), ethical education should aim towards the post-conventional level, where individuals use their own reasoning to define right from wrong on universally good ethical principles, because they themselves have *chosen to do so*. This is very similar to what van Baarda & Verweij (2006) write about the desired outcome of education: "… people who are clearly loyal and disciplined, but who retain a sovereign mind."

On the basis of the theoretical premises presented above, for the sake of sound education we now ask that since ethical behavior in, e.g., decision-making

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2 Prior defines the morality of decency thus that its fundamental concept is universal respect for all human beings as moral agents. The morality of war, according to Prior, is that, e.g., survival, mission or duty are of overriding importance.

is such an intimate and even unconscious process, what requirements will this set to the methodology and techniques of teaching?

Conceptualizing learner: constructivism and self-regulation in learning

Self-regulated learning concerns the application of a certain model of regulation and self-regulation to issues of learning, and therefore instructional implications are relevant. Pintrich (2000) presents that the multitude and overlapping models of self-regulated learning (e.g., social cognitive conception presented by Zimmerman, 1989) share common ground in their profound premises. These premises can be condensed (Pintrich, 2000) in the form of general assumptions as follows:

1. The learner is considered to be an active and constructive participant in the learning process.
2. The learner can monitor, regulate, and control certain aspects of his/her own abilities and those of the environment.
3. There is some type of criterion against which the process is compared.
4. Self-regulatory activities are mediators between personal and contextual characteristics and actual achievement.

The concept of self-regulating learning is a part of the general concept of constructivist learning theory (Brooks & Brooks, 1995; Savery & Duffy, 1996; Tishman, Perkins & Jay, 1995). The theory of constructivism is one of the most influential educational theories in the 20th century. Its elements and principles are of utmost relevance to teaching military ethics.

The leading principles that should be adapted to working with officers on questions of attitudes, moral, and ethics are:

1. Effective learning is based on active conceptualization of information: learning is an active process in which one uses sensory input and constructs meaning from it. Existing knowledge of the world is used to understand new information.
2. Learning is a social process, and this is mediated by personal and cultural points of view, as our learning is intimately associated with our connection with other human beings, our teachers, our peers, our family, as well as casual acquaintances.
3. Learning is accelerated through dialogue, feedback, and discourse.
4. There is a need for authentic tasks that reflect the complexity of the real and relevant world.
5. Encouraging alternative views, mental inquiry, and testing ideas are a part of elaborating critical thinking and building a challenging character.

6. Learning is contextual: we learn in relationship to what we know, what we believe, our prejudices, and our fears.

The learning process can be reified into four phases, in which the self-regulating processes themselves may take place in four areas. These areas are cognition, goal orientation, behavior, and context. As this study does not concern particularly the area of motivational constructs in the learning process, we do not discuss the area of goal orientations; for motivating students and establishing interest is seen as a natural part of teaching. There is evidence that intrinsic value is related to self-regulation, i.e., the student's involvement in self-regulated learning is closely tied to his/her beliefs on how interesting and worth learning the tasks are (e.g., Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). We have also chosen to omit the area of context from this article as the discussion will take place at a general level.[3] The areas of regulation of cognition and behavior are presented in detail in Table 1, as they focus more on the aim of this study to address the methodology of teaching. The cells of Table 1 represent how the phases may be applied in the different areas. Although the nature of any learning process cannot really be compressed into an exact mould, this simplification gives an idea of how to form further working definitions to discuss this matter. The phases are not clearly or strictly separated and their succession may not be linear, but rather dynamic and interlacing. Also, the borders of the areas of regulation are somewhat fuzzy (Pintrich 2000).

Table 1. Phases and areas of self-regulating learning

	Areas of regulation	
Phases	**Cognition**	**Behavior**
1. Forethought, planning and activation	Target goal setting Prior content knowledge activation Metacognitive knowledge activation	Time and effort planning Planning of self-observations of behavior
2. Monitoring	Metacognitive awareness and monitoring of cognition	Awareness and monitoring of effort, time use, need for help Self-observation of behavior
3. Control	Selection and adaptation of cognitive strategies	Increase/decrease effort Persist, give up Help-seeking behavior
4. Reaction and reflection	Cognitive judgment Attributions	Choice behavior

(modified from Pintrich, 2000)

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3   Pintrich (2000) notes that not all models of self-regulation include this area, as it can be seen as an external one, whereas for Zimmerman (1989) activity becomes *self-regulated* when environment-initiated strategies come under personal processes.

Self-regulated learning is defined as an active, constructive process where the learners set goals for their learning and try to monitor, control and regulate their learning guided and constrained by their personal learning goals (Pintrich, 2000; Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; Zimmerman, 1989). With the elaborations on the conception of the learner, the learning process, and the nature of ethics, we will discuss how the case study method is consistent with the idea of promoting the learning of ethics.

Cases to learn from – a general introduction to the case study method

Case studies are an ideal method when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed. Case study research excels at bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue or object, and it can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through previous research. Case studies emphasize detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions whose relationships and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984).

An effective teaching case is actually a story that describes or is based upon real world events or circumstances. This story should carry specific learning objectives, and demands profound and deep analysis (Lynn, 1999). Cases are narrative accounts of actual, or realistic, situations in which policy makers are confronted with the need to make a decision. Cases supply students with information, but not analysis. Case method teaching is a group *enterprise* in which the emphasis is on self-discovery by the class, working together with the guidance of the instructor and producing perceptions, solutions, and question marks where needed. Barnes, Christensen and Hansen (1994) refer to the case study as an "account of events that seem to include enough intriguing decision points and provocative undercurrents to make a discussion group want to think and argue about them". Complex and information-rich cases depict incidents that are open to interpretation – raising questions rather than answering them, encouraging problem solving, calling forth collective intelligence and varied perspectives (Hutchings, 1993; cited by Christudason, 2003).

Military ethics is one of the most complex issues to learn. Developing a commander's ethical awareness means making him capable of distinguishing actual from declared values, of engaging in self-criticism, and of changing. He should internalize and pass on to others universal and professional values, and still give a good enough response to four crucial, inherited tensions: performance of the mission according to its aim, preserving his troops' lives, preserving the

lives and dignity of innocent civilians, and preserving the lives of citizens (Raviv, 2007).

Fleck (2005) writes that to be able to recognize whether something is wrong with respect to ethics is the first condition for ethical behavior. Ethical dilemmas are profoundly complicated deductions to be solved in a jungle of controversial goals and ambiguous directions to follow, and as Raviv (2005) writes, there are no trivial answers to true ethical problems (see also van Baarda & van der Hejden, 2006). Readiness to initiate discussions and disseminations with colleagues of ethical codes and their conduct (Talerud, 2007) as well as constant debate between cognition and affection in both intrapersonal an individual levels (Raviv, 2005) lay at the core of ethical education. The ability of self-reflection as a willingness and consciousness for self-forming activity in order to re-evaluate one's relationship with other humans (Talerud, 2007; Toiskallio 2006, 2007) is the key objective of ethical education.

To promote this understanding and the ability to see the dilemmas and speculate on the alternatives, we need to build a curriculum that can to cross the barriers. The case study method is an excellent one to face those challenges. We have chosen case studies extracted from real-life situations as examples for several reasons; although a holistic view of education is needed to understand the development of ethical competence, some form of formal training is needed to create common a ground and to avoid the spirit of elitism (Robinson, 2007) as well as to ensure that the ethical dilemmas faced are consistent with the environment the trainees are likely to face.

The contents of cases are not very valuable to students without deliberate guidance on the subject. If the examples are put to pedagogical use without deep knowledge of the context it must also be admitted that written cases are usually simplified 2nd or 3rd grade interpretations of very complex situations, where all the facts of the case may not even be known. For this reason it can be said that solutions offered by scholars to such dilemmas may sometimes carry nothing more than the burden of their makers' prejudice. It is also plausible that the trainees cannot make a distinction between true discussions on a sensitive and complex matter and a politically and subjectively twisted scheme. Therefore it is *the evaluation and critical dissemination* of the cases that will promote ethical competence. Martinelli-Fernandez (2006) writes that Kant's steps of moral education remain valid and states that "through an agent's assessment of the actions of another one is set on the path of moral agency". Didactically, the instructor should foremost set the conditions for the students to develop a habit of moral assessment. The expertise of the instructors is also a prerequisite for success, as case-studies are only effective if the instructors themselves have knowledge of what the case studies are meant to demonstrate (Robinson, 2007).

The Dutch approach: the flow model to reach the decision

In the Dutch example (see van Baarda, 2006a; van Baarda, 2006b) of forming a moral judgment, a so called dynamic model (flow model) is introduced. In the flow model, solution is sought via a recognition and re-definition of a problem through a path to knowledge, and consideration of the goals and means is related to the problem. This process is illustrated in Figure 1 and broken into five steps as follows (the superscripts refer to Figure 1):

1. From perceiving a problem[A] to describing the facts[B]
2. From observation[B] to interpretation[C]
3. From preference[C] to feasibility[D]
4. From the path of choice[E] to the decision[A] : matching the path of knowledge and the path of choice.(van Baarda, 2006a)

Figure 1. Illustration of the Dynamical Model.

(van Baarda, 2006a, p. 285)

It should be noted that although this may seem a very simplified and, to some scholars, quite mechanistic presentation, van Baarda (2006a) notes that it has been reified for the purpose of readability, and the presentation is given without scientific discussion of the background of the model. Van Baarda (2006a; 2006b) also clearly states that the focus is that the flow model should not be seen as a formula of some kind or a procedural directive: "A well balanced judgment is seldom instantaneous: it is preceded by a whole process. A judgment process rarely follows a straight line; on the contrary, it is a dynamic process". The unique nature of this model is revealed by comparing it to other decision making models, which

van Baarda refers to as rational theories, so that the flow model takes the person making the decision into the account, i.e., in training situation students are involved in the situation instead of only commenting and evaluating it from the outside (van Baarda, 2006a; 2006b).

The instruction using the presented model is constructed of certain phases and exercises and emphasizes the social and discussion skills needed to deal with emotionally charged subjects. The purpose of this method is to teach how a morally responsible decision can be made, and it is of complementary nature to normal decision-making procedures, as concern is expressed on whether resistance will be met if the model is (mistakenly) identified to be a consensus model not fitting in the chain of command (van Baarda, 2006b.). Even though it is meant that the process and the skills calling for the reflection of one's own actions and premises would be the focus of this method, it is quite obvious that if the manual is followed to detail, i.e., by disseminating any given case according to the five steps described above, the instructor will be required to have notable skills himself so that the training will not succumb to rote learning of yet another procedure. The Dutch manual also presents a collection of hypothetical dilemmas to be used in training; the cases are written with a lot of information and they only lay out the situation; there are no solutions or added guidelines to discussions (Springer, 2006).

It needs to be noted that this discussion is not to be taken as a valid critique based on a thorough analysis of the fine Dutch volume, as it carries highly structured theoretical discussions in profound articles creating a framework much deeper and wider than is practical to take into account in this study. Every attempt to contribute to teaching methodology is most welcome, but also likely to highlight the numerous difficulties and ambiguities of education in the field of ethics.

The Canadian way: the value based approach to decision making

The Canadian Forces base their ethical considerations on a construct called value-based decision making. In this framework it is seen that the military ethos is comprised of a) Canadian military values that are elaborated from contributions of b) beliefs and expectations about military service that set the conditions and values essential for military effectiveness, and c) Canadian values, expectations and beliefs that provide a philosophy of service. Professionalism is shaped by the ethos and therefore the ethos governs the conduct (Canadian Defence Academy, 2006).

The Canadian instructors' manual introduces a sequence of discussion guidelines (also referred to as *steps*) to be employed in training (and supposedly, in a way, in real events) that include a) assessment of the situation, b) ethical considerations, and c) options and risks. *Assessment of the situation* (here) is a general summary in which facts and perceptions of the situation, as well as other issues,

including implicit and personal and environmental factors, are taken into account. *Ethical considerations* include identifying the relevant ethical principles of the Canadian Forces and the listed ethical values that shape the conduct of its members. Via these considerations, the type of ethical dilemma is determined. In the step of *options and risks* a variety of possible courses of action are evaluated and reflected. These guidelines or steps are followed by committing to action, wherein the student must choose a solution he/she has outlined in the process, or by combining aspects from several options. The case studies presented in the instructors' manual all include tailored contents on these guidelines (ibid.).

Practical application of this method is introduced with advice that the provided responses are only "possible", in other words, the instructor can use them as a starting point for discussions. The authors warn that effective solutions are not limited to this selection. Also, the users of the instructors' manual are invited to modify the given answers, guidelines and aspects of the cases. Both the Dutch and the Canadian argue on the behalf of personal involvement of students. A fundamentally important feature is that the student must position him-/herself as the one responsible in the event (ibid.).

The case studies in the Canadian manual are presented in a very condensed and template-like manner. An interesting, though not essential matter concerning pedagogical implications, is that whereas the Dutch presentation clearly states that their dilemmas are hypothetical and only carry coincidental similarities with real events, the Canadian explicitly point out that their cases are transcribed from real-life situations (Canadian Defence Academy, 2006; Springer, 2006).

The chances are high that these exemplary guidelines and their contents might be taken as an answer at face value or even as rules of thumb for what is really right. This, as discussed earlier in this chapter is a challenge when using such materials as pedagogical materials. The use of case studies, i.e., dilemmas, requires the teachers not to oversimplify the level of unambiguous problem-solving, but also to make sure that profound abilities are developed.

The Israeli way: the multiple approach attitude

The IDF colleges have developed a holistic approach for teaching military ethics. The curriculum was developed as a response to the unique and complex security environment Israel lives in, confronting conventional and non-conventional threats, and of course, the threat of in-house terror. Israel is the only democracy in the world that faces an enormous terror threat: in term of endurance, span, and intensity. Israeli commanders should be prepared to apply military ethics when confronting regular Arab militaries, homicide-suicide terrorists, terror-oriented

guerrilla forces, and even when operating in front of Israeli citizens when illegal settlers have to be evacuated.

The IDF colleges have developed a learning approach containing multidimensional pedagogical and contextual elements that are based on ten arguments:

a) The professional angle

The IDF puts a specific emphasis on developing the soldier's proper behavior and his professional identity. This is done under the assumption that each practice in valuable subjects is a step up in the professional area. The IDF code and concept of military ethics is of a practical ideal of our behavior (Kasher, 1997). Professionalism means knowing things you did not know earlier in their depth, to develop unique skills, and to dedicate attention to implicit dimensions of the profession. Each profession needs to develop its own professional identity, not only universal moral values. Therefore great emphasis is laid upon the idea of a military within the democratic state, and constraints are put on the military commanders and soldiers as a result.

b) Cases that touch the three interfaces

When developing ethical awareness it is important to notice the three main entities with which the military professional interacts: the people – the basic body for which he works, i.e., the democratic state and all its citizens; colleagues – commanders, subordinates, the unit; and obviously – the enemy. The IDF Spirit deals with all three, and sets principles that give the right value for each interaction. However, during the years there has been a different emphasis as a consequence of actual events. For example, let us take a unique event: during 2005, disengagement from the Gaza Strip took place, meaning the evacuation of 25 settlements in the Gaza Strip and the Northern West Bank. This created a dramatic test to the Israeli society and democracy and put a complex challenge for Israel's interagency security cooperation. Therefore there was a need to design a case study-based curriculum that sets up the experienced intellectual and emotional dilemmas concerning the questions of: How will the IDF succeed in executing a law enforcement mission? How will the military face violence from Israelis and still keep the IDF Spirit? How will we deal with implications of refusal? Hence, the colleges should constantly develop cases that reflect the complex, actual reality and invite the officers to present their cases concerning these subjects.

c) Different analysis of fighting terror and high intensity conflict

The Spirit of the IDF is the identity card of the IDF values, which should stand as the foundation of all of the activities of every IDF soldier, on regular or reserve duty. It contains universal values such as *tenacity of purpose in performing missions and drive to victory*, as well as *responsibility, personal example, purity of arms* and so on. However, it seems that the conditions of the fight against terror are essentially different from the conditions that are assumed to exist in the classical war or the law enforcement paradigm (Kasher & Yadlin, 2005). Therefore a third model, as Kasher and Yadlin claim, was needed.

In the Post Cold War, conventional conflicts between sovereign national states have been replaced by civil, religious, gang, or ethnic wars. They are marked by diffuse power structures, missing force monopolies and often changing boundaries between enemies and allies, by asymmetrical warfare using civilian population as basic resource, by migrations, and by humanitarian catastrophes (Kaldor, 1999).

The soldier's classic actions are aimed at attacking and destroying an enemy, if necessary by all means. Ambiguous situations are disconcerting for the soldier and often provoke falling back on trained, reflexive behavior (Haltiner, 2003). Therefore there is a need to apply different principles of ethical consideration. Those principles should reflect real and hypothetical cases, and require application of principles such as self-defense duty, military necessity, or principle of distinction, for example.

When dealing with terrorist entities, which by their definition conceal themselves amongst civilian population, and whose target of harm is the civilian population, one needs an elaborated angle to deal with the challenge. Therefore, the curriculum should include historical and hypothetical cases that focus on these different issues in order to prepare the officers for the future.

d) Four contradictions

When fighting terror, many ethical questions rise in calling the "right" decision. For example, when is it justified to impose a siege around a town when we know for sure that a suicide bomber is about to leave it, carrying explosives on his body in order to commit homicide in a crowded bus? When is it justified to thoroughly check all passengers at a road block? Every action the commander chooses has its own price and further consequences. Each choice has to take into consideration questions of the commander's responsibility for the soldiers' lives, the obvious need to complete the mission, the keeping of human dignity and the daily routine of civilians on the other side, and sustaining your own civilians' security by thwarting all enemy efforts to disrupt the normal way of life in Israel. Almost every choice encloses harm in one or more dimensions. This insecure reality, together with

changes in the society's values concerning canonical organizations, requires brave treatment of war moral, ethics, and leadership questions.

e) The ethical chapter and the embedded holistic curriculum

The basis of military ethics curriculum is grasping the subject consisting of supplementary contradictions and a combination of abstract ideas which are connected to the military's duty in a democratic country. Also the portrayals of practical principles that make cognitive tools and are part of the professional practice are needed (Raviv, 2005). Another contradiction is the need to give simple and practical answers in spite of the complex and dynamic world in which the officers meet new, unfamiliar situations. In this ever-changing reality, there is an ever-growing difficulty to provide the officer with a system of orders and procedures that will resolve any problem that might occur. To this reality, the professionals must be supplied with cognitive and analytic tools that are wide-ranging and smart, and not technical rules of "dos and don'ts". All this requires an integrative curriculum that includes ethical dealing as a separate or intertwined chapter, as a formal lesson, as a feedback and a systematic appraisal of students, as the subject of the staff's and of external lecturers' teaching, as an area through which the IDF's activity today and in past wars is to be inspected, and as a criterion by which the college appraises the staff, the course, or the individual. The ethical prism will merge when discussing combat, but also when talking about the force-building routine.

f) The learner's experience

All colleges' officers are mature and adult learners. Majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels, they all possess a rich source of expertise, experience and self guidance capabilities, as well as skepticism. They are instrumentally interested in the teaching topics, i.e., they are purpose oriented. They are critical and creative thinkers who can adapt and thrive in ambiguous and ever-changing environments. Therefore, the topics should be relevant to their everyday problems, and connected to the role of self-concept.

Thus, the case study method, as a part of varying teaching methods, is highly suitable. It promotes the ability to listen, respect other considerations, and stand behind your own views. It makes it possible to change an attitude, alter a view, improve the ability to contribute to the decision making process as a social or political process, it can strengthen the will and ability to promote change, and solve professional problems. The method assists in providing a pedagogical atmosphere of openness, authentic argumentation, and criticism.

g) Instruction provided by the staff and field commanders

The educational process of military ethics is led by the commanders and the academic professors. The professors set the theoretical base and the fundamental concepts, but the commanders are responsible for relating it to professional combat reality. The commander is the subject of identification; he is an example for soldiers and creates stimuli and learning experiences. His role is to provide ethical interpretation at every opportunity, not only in the ordered chapter of the program, but in the analysis of military topics, combat drills, military history, etc. It is imperative that the staff itself has a thorough conceptual framework for ethic evaluation, and the skill to encourage reflective thought (Raviv, 2005). The staff must professionalize and familiarize itself with the considerations behind the Spirit of the IDF, the essence of the military in the democratic state, and international law. The staff should take advantage of different events in the course and design them into a critical ethical event that creates an emotional stimulus for further strengthening of the learning process.

However, working with cases sets a psychological challenge for the instructors. It demands a thorough understanding of the case and its alternatives, skills of discussion facilitation, an ability to clarify and summarize without controlling the dynamic process, and it demands an ability to learn from one's class, too.

h) The ideal phases of learning and teaching with cases

Working with cases has four stages: designing the case, preparing the group, discussions, and summary. Sometimes it is the students themselves who present their cases, sometimes it is the instructor who chooses the specific case. Every effective facilitation of a case should contain the following analytic stages (Lynn, 1999):

a) Understanding the facts: Who? What? When? Where?
b) Analyzing the facts: Why? How come?
c) Mapping the core challenge: So what? What is the meaning of all this?
d) Action: What would *you* do?
e) Raising assumptions: What would have happened if?
f) Forecasting: What will happen as a consequence?
g) Lesson learned and conclusions: This is an example of [...]? What is the meaning of this example? Where should it lead us?

An ideal fruitful case discussion should rely on these phases, as well as on integration and a summary of all the topics that were raised in class. Special attention may be given to relevant points that were not mentioned, and the instructor should trigger a short discussion on the reasons why these topics were ignored.

i) Types of cases

There are five types of cases (Lynn, 1999):

a) Cases that require a decision in the event that there are constraints or vague data
b) Cases that demand a policy making and a framework of conceptualization
c) Cases that demand a problem definition
d) Cases that call for implementation of an idea or theory
e) Demonstration of a historical case – which resembles a frontal lecture.

The IDF colleges try to represent a blend of all five, and maybe tend to use more the first type. Because of the complex security reality in Israel, there will always be a need for a transformation of learning from class to the battlefield. All commanders constantly make ethical decisions; therefore, they should be instructed in class.

j) Using tactical and operational decision making cases

It is understood that national defense students usually tend to analyze cases that deal with national flair and dimensions, in the context of political-security consequences, inner-society issues, and civil military relations. The younger officers, however, tend to analyze more tactical cases, which are closer to their world and reality as unit commanders.

However, although the case study method is common in the IDF colleges, a constant pedagogical elaboration is needed, as well as constant developing of new cases. Every instructor has his own teaching style, and a lot of effort should be invested into the general code and the direction the college as a whole should be steering.

Summary

Military ethics is one of the most complicated subjects professionals need to learn. Because of the aspects mentioned above, touching the learners' hidden agendas can influence the will to change and elaborate normative thinking. Teaching with cases can upgrade this influence and invite the learner to explore his own self and the military institution in a journey of elaboration and self inspection. Combining cases with a solid theoretical background, as well as building a multi-dimensional approach can minimize the danger of over-generalization and over-simplification from a single specific event.

The examples of different national points of view, related to the role and realities of armed forces of each nation, seem to suggest that although the case study method, adopted in different forms, is a most promising choice to promote ethical competence, there may be interesting if yet implicit features to be discovered. As it is, the case study method requires very much from the narratives or stories presented, i.e., these requirements fall on educators engaged in creating and evaluating the materials. All the approaches discussed clearly indicate that the role of the teacher is far from the traditional image of a schoolmaster, as it is from the traditional image of a military instructor drilling his/her subordinates. The teaching of ethics, and especially the case study method, demands sophisticated perceptions of learning and the learner, skill in the guidance of learning, social skills combined with a right attitude, and deep knowledge of the phenomena under dissemination.

Therefore, although the case study method is an excellent choice in the field of teaching ethics, more detailed information about the interaction between several aspects are needed for further development of applications. For example, how are the instructor's personal methodological elaborations discussed among the educators and the students? Do the personal epistemologies of the educators and the students predict their perceptions of the actual learning sessions and the outcome of training? How are the educators educated prior to their employment in the field of teaching ethics? What kind of pedagogical simulations fully prepare them to facilitate a case discussion?

There is also a need for further research on the possible models marking the proportion between cases and the general curriculum. What is the vital knowledge needed prior to learning with cases? What correlation should there be between the student's learning styles and the case method?

The meanings and relations of motivational constructs and the contexts of learning need to be clarified to gain a more coherent idea of how people learn ethics. Further research on this area should utilize the possibilities to gather empirical data during ethical training in order to address the challenges of military pedagogy when the need for ethical education is becoming more and more crucial.

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